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Abstract
The Constitutional Court has functioned in Hungary since 1989. Its activity shaped the 
frame of democratic state of law and influenced the constitutional order in Hungary. In 
2011 the National Assembly passed the new Act on the Constitutional Court that re-
placed a previous one from 1989. The provisions of the Act and the Fundamental Law 
reduced the role and position of the Court as a separated body in the tripartite power 
division. The reduction of competences is accompanied by the diminishing of the con-
cluded cases as well.
Streszczenie
Pozycja i działalność Sądu Konstytucyjnego Węgier w latach 2011–2019
Węgierski Sąd Konstytucyjny został ustanowiony w tym kraju w 1989 roku. Jego dzia-
łalność pozwoliła na ukształtowanie podstaw demokratycznego państwa prawa i po-
rządku konstytucyjnego Węgier. W 2011 roku węgierski parlament przyjął nową usta-
wę o Sądzie Konstytucyjnym, która zastąpiła pochodzącą z 1989 roku. Przepisy nowej 
ustawy oraz Fundamentalnego Prawa ograniczyły rolę i pozycję Sądu Konstytucyjne-
1 ORCID ID: 0000-0002-7609-4002, Assoc. Prof., Institute of Political Sciences, Faculty 
of Social Sciences, University of Silesia in Katowice. E-mail: sebastian.kubas@us.edu.pl.
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go jako niezależnego organu władzy mieszczącego się w węgierskim trójpodziale wła-




Generally, the Constitutional Court is a quite new element in the law and po-
litical system comparing to the evolutional emergence of legislative, executive 
and judiciary branches. It appeared as a body to check if constitutional pro-
visions are respected by other law acts. The complicated and not clear alloca-
tion of the Courts among tripartite power division lead us to the question if 
they are judiciary bodies? The Constitutional Court does not belong to judi-
ciary branch, yet has some common features like the decisions are binding, 
judges must be required from those who have judicial experiences, both Con-
stitutional and other courts of law follow the procedures in their work2. The 
differing specificity of Constitutional courts in the tripartite power division 
is their main competence to make decisions on conformity of legal acts with 
the text of Constitution and binding and ultimate character of decisions, pos-
sibility of passing own rules and limiting budget3.
The idea to establish the Constitutional Court in Hungary and oth-
er Central and Eastern European countries came from the need to imple-
ment full democratic values that emerged after the fall of communism. In 
1989, among the most important tasks of such courts was purging then ex-
isting systems of law from any previous remains and stabilizing new dem-
ocratic order. The courts were to protect new constitutionalism from any 
possible deviations4. The new courts in Central and Eastern Europe were 
2 K. Wojtyczek, Sądownictwo konstytucyjne w Polsce. Wybrane zagadnienia, Warsaw 2003, 
pp. 85–93.
3 A. Ludwikowska, Sądownictwo konstytucyjne w Europie Środkowo-Wschodniej, Toruń 
2002, pp. 40–41, 44.
4 K. Wojtyczek, op.cit., pp. 265–267.
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built upon the Kelsenian model5. It was assumed that such separated body 
from other institutions would be independent and would guarantee apolit-
ical form of democratic state of law6. In 1989, the Hungarian Triangle Ta-
ble negotiators of the regime shift decided to construct the Constitutional 
Court on the West German model7. After two decades, in 2011, the execu-
tive and legislative authorities of Hungary decided to reshape the position 
of the Constitutional Court.
The article analyzes the legal basis of contemporary Constitutional Court 
of Hungary in connection to the act that was passed by parliament in 2011 
and replaced the previous provisions from 1989. The legal analysis is enriched 
by empirical data of the outcome of the Constitutional Court activity to show 
if the quantity of work changed after 2011 or not. The presented analysis re-
veals the practical dimension of introducing and shaping the position of the 
Constitutional Court in the last decade after 2011. So, the core aim of the ar-
ticle is to show the changes in the role and position of the Court both in le-
gal and political dimension. Apart from the introduction and summary, the 
article consists of the analysis of legal and practical functioning of the Con-
stitutional Court in Hungary in 1989–2011, and the analysis of legal basis of 
Constitutional Court upon the 2011 Act and contemporary practice of this 
body. The methods used in the research were: analysis, synthesis, institution-
al approach and comparative method.
The main thesis refers to the statement that position of the Hungarian 
Constitutional Court was diminished by the executive power after 2011. Re-
garding the thesis I would like to ask two questions: 1) what kind of compe-
tences of the Constitutional Court of Hungary were reduced after 2011 com-
paring to those from 1989?, 2) how does the activity of the Constitutional 
Court look like in 2011–2019?
5 J. Ferejohn, P. Pasquino, Constitutional Courts as Deliberative Institutions: Toward an 
Institutional Theory of Constitutional Justice, [in:] Constitutional Justice, East and West. Democratic 
Legitimacy and Constitutional Courts in Post-Communist Europe in a Comparative Perspective, 
ed. W. Sadurski, the Hague-London-New York 2002, pp. 30–31.
6 D. Rousseau, Sądownictwo konstytucyjne w Europie, Warsaw 1999, p. 28.
7 K. Kelemen, The Hungarian Constitutional Court in the New Constitutional Framework, 
http://www.academia.edu/1760644/The Hungarian Constitutional Court in the new consti-
tutional framework (12.02.2020).
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II.
Although the Constitutional Court of democratic Hungry was implemented 
into law system in 1989, the Hungarian political system of previous commu-
nist regime included a kind of constitutional revision authority. The Council 
of the Constitutional Law was created in 1984 and functioned to 1989. It was 
an internal parliamentary commission of advisory character, yet as Mirosław 
Granat states this body did not fulfill duties of real constitutional courts8.
So, the 1989 constitutional amendments to the 1949 Hungarian Constitu-
tion introduced the Constitutional Court for the first time in this country on 
the basis of Austrian and German model9. It was done by Art. 32/A included 
into the fourth chapter of the Constitution10. During the period of functioning 
of this Constitution the Art. 32/A was revised twice. The Act XXXII of 1989 
on the Constitutional Court was adopted on 19 October 1989. The Constitu-
tional Court had quite a large number of competences to control both legis-
lative and executive bodies, e.g. until 1998 was eligible for making preventive 
control of not promulgated parliamentary acts. The Hungarian constitutional 
system introduced actio popularis as well. Generally, among the competences 
of the Constitutional Court were as follows: the conformity of acts with the 
Constitution and international treaties, possibility of cancellation of uncon-
stitutional provisions and acts, examination of conflicts of competences and 
responsibility of president, dissolution of local authorities11.
Initially the number of judges of the Constitutional Court was 15, but 11 
after 1994. The reduction effected from not well functioning of the composi-
tion of 15 members panel which showed first symptom of failure of Austrian 
8 M. Granat, Sądowa kontrola konstytucyjności prawa w państwach Europy Środkowej 
i Wschodniej, Warsaw 2003, pp. 97–101.
9 G. Halamai, The Hungarian Approach to Constitutional Review: The End of Activism? The 
First Decade of the Hungarian Constitutional Court, [in:] Constitutional Justice, East and West 
Democratic Legitimacy and Constitutional Courts in Post-Communist Europe in a Comparative 
Perspective, ed. W. Sadurski, the Hague-London-New York 2002, p. 227.
10 The Constitution of Hungary of 1949 with the 1989 amendments, § 32/A, https://www.
wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/hu/hu047en.pdf (10.02.2020).
11 Act LXXIV of 1994 Amending the Constitution of the Republic of Hungary, § 1, https://
oxcon.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:ocw/cd402.regGroup.1/law-ocw-cd402?prd=OXCON 
(5.02.2020).
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and German model implemented in Hungary. The term of office for judges 
was 9 years with the possibility of one re-election. The Hungarian parliament 
elected judges upon motion of the parliamentary committee. The commis-
sion consisted of one representative of each parliamentary party. The Hun-
garian National Assembly elected each judge by 2/3 majority of votes with 
the quorum12.
The first composition of judges of Constitutional Court was accomplished 
in 1994 reaching number of 15. First 10 judges were elected by the 1990 parlia-
ment, while the last 5 by 1994 parliament. Such long time of the election of all 
judges was due to lack of agreement on the candidates among the members of 
parliamentary committee responsible for their appointment. This problem be-
came permanent during the application of 1989 Act on Constitutional Court 
as one parliamentary party was eligible to provide one candidate for a judge. 
This obstacle was reduced in 2011 when it was amended to the 1989 Act on 
Constitutional Court that if the parliament is unable to elect a new judge af-
ter 90 days of the expiry of a post of a previous judge, this judge is on his/her 
post till the final election13. Upon the 1989 Act on the Hungarian Constitu-
tional Court candidates were qualified from those with law experience of 20 
years or being a university professor or doctor of law and being older than 45 
years of age. Judges could not match their offices with being members of leg-
islative and executive power, working in business, belonging to political par-
ties. They could work in education, science or artistic fields. The judges had 
the immunity that could be withdrawn by the plenary decision of the Con-
stitutional Court. The Constitutional Court judges appointed from among 
themselves the President and the Vice-President of the court for a term of 
three years. The internal organization of the Court enabled to make deci-
sions in the specific cases on a plenary session, while lower level of cases re-
quired chambers of only three judges14.
12 W. Brodziński, System konstytucyjny Węgier, Warsaw 2003, pp. 65–66; A. Czyż, S. Ku-
bas, Doświadczenia węgierskiej transformacji ustrojowej – od Jánosá Kádára do Viktora Orbána, 
Katowice 2011, pp. 117–119.
13 Act CLI of 2011 on the Constitutional Court, http://www.mkab.hu/rules/act-on-the-cc 
(3.02.2020).
14 G. Brunner, Structure and Proceedings of the Hungarian Constitutional Judiciary, [in:] 
Constitutional Judiciary in a New Democracy. The Hungarian Constitutional Court, eds. L. Sol-
yom, S.G. Breyer, University of Michgan 2000, pp. 65–102; K. Kelemen, op.cit.
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The first President of Hungarian Constitutional Court was László Sólyom 
(1990–1998) then János Németh (1998–2003), András Holló (2003–2005), Mi-
hály Bihari (2005–2008) and Péter Paczolay (2008–2015) who was the last one 
elected upon the 1989 Act on Constitutional Court. Especially the L. Solyom’s 
term in office was crucial to stabilize the position of the Constitutional Court 
as an independent institution. This body took great activity both interpreting 
the Constitution and shaping the democratic state of law15.
III.
The structure and proceedings of the contemporary Constitutional Court of 
Hungary upon the 2011 Act should be analyzed based on the following criteria: 
1) appointment and composition of judges of the Constitutional Court; 2) in-
ternal organization of the Court; 3) competences of the Constitutional Court.
The first one refers to the way of appointing and the composition of judg-
es. This element can be regarded on four dimensions: the number of judges 
and time of their cadencies, the state authorities who are eligible for appoint-
ing the judges, needed qualifications for becoming a judge, and privileges of 
judges due to their activity.
After 2011 there are 15 judges elected for 12 years by the 2/3 majority of 
votes of the National Assembly. Judges cannot be re-elected. The names of 
candidates are proposed by parliamentary nominating committee which 
consists of 9–15 representatives of all parliamentary parties. The number of 
representatives depends on the size of a party in the National Assembly. The 
judges cannot be members of political parties and involved in any political or 
economic activity. They cannot take any position or mandate in state or local 
government administration and run gainful activity except for educational, 
scientific, editorial, proof-reading, artistic and intellectual one.
The judges are qualified from candidates that have a law degree, are lawyers 
of outstanding knowledge or have at least twenty years of professional work 
experience connected with law. They must be not younger than 45 years of 
age and not older than 70. The judges could not be members of government, 
15 G. Halamai, op.cit., p. 232.
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leaders of any political party and leading state officials in the four years pri-
or to the election on the post of judge.
Each judge has an immunity which means he/she is not accountable for 
his/her activities while exercising legal competences during and after the term 
of office. Immunity does not include the situation while a judge reveals a state 
secret. A judge can be taken into custody if he/she is caught in the act, but any 
criminal or other proceedings may be applied only with the prior consent of 
the Constitutional Court. The motion for the suspension of immunity shall 
be submitted to the President of the Constitutional Court by the Prosecu-
tor General. The mandate of a judge is terminated after the expiration of the 
term of office, death, resignation, due to incompatibility or exclusion, reach-
ing 70 years of age. The exclusion is announced on the plenary meeting of the 
Constitutional Court if a judge fails to perform his/her duties, was unworthy, 
committed prosecuted crime, has not participated in the work of the Con-
stitutional Court for one year for reasons imputable to him/her, made a false 
declaration on important data or facts in his or her declaration of assets16.
The second element of the analysis of the Constitutional Court is its in-
ternal organization. While analyzing this factor, there should be considered 
such issues as: the way of organizing the functioning of the Court, filling the 
post of President of the Court and the mode adjudication. Among two mod-
els of the organization of work in a Constitutional Court, the Hungarians de-
cided to construct an expanded structure, not a simply one which exists in 
France17. The seat of Constitutional Court of Hungary is Budapest. The Na-
tional Assembly elects the President of the Constitutional Court by two thirds 
of votes. All administrative tasks of the Court are managed by the Office the 
Constitutional Court which is directed by the Secretary General.
The principal body of the Court is the plenary session consisting of all its 
members. The Secretary General takes part in the plenary session ex officio. 
The quorum of the plenary session must be attended by at least two thirds of 
the members. The decisions are made by open ballot, secret ballot, by a ma-
jority of votes and without abstention. The decisions can be made by panels 
as well. The proposal of referring the case to a panel is made by the President 
16 Act CLI of 2011 on the Constitutional Court, http://www.mkab.hu/rules/act-on-the-cc 
(3.02.2020).
17 D. Rousseau, op.cit., pp. 48–50.
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of the Court who appoints the judges responsible for working over a case. The 
panel can consist of 5 members or less. The composition of the panels should 
be changed every three years and the presiding judge should be replaced every 
year. Panels can be temporary or standing ones.
The third part of the analysis refers to the types of competences of the Con-
stitutional Court. Presenting this problem there should be analyzed: types of 
subjects who can submit the motion to the Court, the proceedings and the 
character of decisions.
There are following main competences of the Constitutional Court: 1) re-
view of conformity legal acts with the Fundamental Law18 and international 
treaties (ex ante and ex post), 2) examination of judicial initiative for the con-
trol of norms in concrete cases, 3) constitutional complaint, 4) examination 
of conflicts with international treaties, 5) examination of parliamentary res-
olution related to ordering referendum, 6) opinion on the dissolution of a lo-
cal representative body operating contrary to the Fundamental Law, 7) opin-
ion on the operation of a religious community contrary to the Fundamental 
Law, 8) removal of the President of the Republic from office, 9) resolving con-
flicts of competence, 10) examination of local government decrees, 11) nor-
mative decisions and orders, and decisions on the uniform application of the 
law interpretation of the Fundamental Law19.
Now let us analyze the competences and types of subjects who can sub-
mit the motions. First, the review of conformity of legal acts with the Con-
stitution can be made both ex ante and ex post. In the ex ante cases the Na-
tional Assembly and the President of the Republic may submit the motion 
to the Constitutional Court. The subjects entitled to submit the motion to re-
view the conformity of legal acts vary depending on the type of a case. Sec-
ond, a judge who works on a concrete case is bound to apply a legal provision 
because he/she perceives it to be contrary to the Constitution, then he/she 
can submit the motion to the Constitutional Court suspending the judicial 
proceedings. Third, a person or an organization can put forward a petition 
to the Court if the application of a legal provision is contrary to the Consti-
tution. Fourth, one quarter of the parliamentary members, the government, 
18 The Fundamental Law is an official name of the Hungarian Constitution.
19 Act CLI of 2011 on the Constitutional Court, http://www.mkab.hu/rules/act-on-the-cc 
(3.02.2020).
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the President of the Curia (Hungarian Supreme Court), the Prosecutor Gen-
eral and the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights can request to examine 
conflicts of legal acts and judicial proceedings with international treaties. The 
Constitutional Court shall examine these cases ex officio as well. Fifth, the 
Constitutional Court examines parliamentary resolutions ordering or dis-
missing the ordering the referendum. Sixth, the government can submit the 
motion of examining if a local representative body or national self-govern-
ment act according with the Fundamental Law. Seventh, the government and 
the Court itself can declare a petition to examine the activity of the legal op-
eration of a religious community. Eighth, the parliament submits the motion 
to remove the President of the Republic from office if he/she violates the Fun-
damental Law. Ninth, the Constitutional Court can resolve the conflict be-
tween state organs and local government organs referring to the interpreta-
tion of the Fundamental Law. Tenth, the Constitutional Court examines the 
conformity of decrees of local government. Eleventh, the National Assembly, 
the President, the government, the Commissioner of the Fundamental Rights, 
the Constitutional Court interprets the provisions of the Fundamental Law 
regarding a concrete case.
The short description of proceedings is following: The motions must be 
submitted to the Constitutional Court only by the representatives of a case 
who have a degree in law; The petitions shall contain an explicit request and 
the reasons for initiating the proceedings; The proceedings of the Constitu-
tional Court are free of charge; The Secretary General examines initially of 
the motion meets all the needed requirements; The panel of the Constitutional 
Court decides in the admission of constitutional complaint. During the pro-
ceedings, the Court can invite the petitioner to the personal hearing, can in-
vite and expert if the case is connected with the violation of human rights.
The decisions of the Constitutional Court are biding and not appealable 
to any further investigation. If a judge opposes the final decision of the Court, 
he/she may declare dissenting opinion. The decision on the lack of conform-
ity of any legal act with the Fundamental Law makes this act invalid. The de-
cisions are published in the State Official Journal20.
20 Act CLI of 2011 on the Constitutional Court, http://www.mkab.hu/rules/act-on-the-cc 
(3.02.2020).
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IV.
The Constitutional Court of Hungary played a significant role in shaping 
democratic regime in the first two decades of democratization process. It 
was a real and independent institution that was a counterweight for the 
National Assembly during the process of legislation. After 2011, the Court 
became dependent on executive power (government). The actions taken 
by Fidesz government aimed at subordinating this organ and make more 
obedient to the executive power. The first difference between the 1989 Act 
on Constitutional Court and the 2011 one is the nominating process. After 
2011, the composition of the representatives of the nominating parliamen-
tary committee which elects the candidates does not have to reach aa con-
sensus. Before 2011, each party had one representative, today the number of 
representatives depends on the number of deputies a party has in the Na-
tional Assembly. So, it is possible that all judges are elected by the majority 
of votes of the ruling party. The 2011 Act on the Constitutional Court ex-
tended the term of office of a judge from 9 to 12 years. The President of the 
Constitutional Court is not elected by judges, but by the National Assembly. 
The second difference, the Fidesz-KDNP government extended the number 
of judges from 11 to 15 to get possibility to elect 4 own members just in the 
beginning of the Viktor Orbán second government term of office. Moreo-
ver, the ruling coalition implemented into the Act the limitation of upper 
age that eligible for the judge to work to 70 years of age which aimed at ear-
lier retirement of the judges elected by previous parliament. The third, to-
day the Court can review the budgeting act of Hungary only if it violates 
the human rights unless the debt is not over half of gross domestic product. 
Before, the Court could examine the conformity of a state budget with the 
Constitution nevertheless of the debt was over 50% of gross domestic prod-
uct or not. Due to contemporary provisions, the government is less bound 
by the possibility of the Constitutional Court revision of its financial poli-
cy. The fourth, the 2011 Act of Hungarian Constitutional Court abolished 
the actio popularis which let every citizen to initiate the proceedings in the 
Constitutional Court in the name of public interest21. The fifth, after 2010 
21 I. Halász, R. Grabowski, Hungarian understanding of the division of powers, “Przegląd 
Prawa Konstytucyjnego” 2016, No. 6, p. 70, 72.
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elections and the Fidesz-KDNP changes of the law, the Constitutional Court 
examined the conformity of legal acts initially with the 1949 Constitution 
revised in 1989 and then with the 2011 Fundamental Law. The court decid-
ed several times the unconstitutionality of the provisions including three 
amendments to the Fundamental Law (October 29, 2012, December 6, 2012 
and January 4, 2013)22. On March 11, 2013, to avoid such resolutions, the 
National Assembly dominated by Fidesz decided to introduce the fourth 
amendment to the Fundamental Law. From the perspective of activity and 
competences of the Constitutional Court, it is worth to analyze the fourth 
amendment because it drastically limited the position and role of the Con-
stitutional Court of Hungary. The fourth amendments to the Fundamental 
Law included all provisions that were decided unconstitutional by the Con-
stitutional Court in 2012. The crucial factor of the amendments was that the 
Constitutional Court can review an amendment to the Fundamental Law 
on procedural grounds only and cannot do that on the substantive grounds. 
Moreover, the fourth amendment stated that the Court cannot refer to all 
its decisions made before January 1, 201223.
V.
From 1 January 2012 to 30 September 2019 the Hungarian Constitution-
al Court examined 516,7 concluded cases every year on average. The largest 
number of cases was in 2012 (1237) which was connected with the fact of in-
troduction of the Fundamental Law and petitions on the conformity of oth-
er acts with the new Constitution. Among the types of cases of the Consti-
tutional court the constitutional complaints present as the most numerous 
(389,3 every year on average). The next places are taken by: judicial initiative 
for norm controlling in concrete cases (64,3), examination of the conform-
22 The Orange Files. The Amendments to the Fundamental Law, https://theorangefiles.hu/
amendments-to-the-fundamental-law (17.02.2020).
23 N. Chronowski, M. Varju, P. Bárd, G. Sulyok, Hungary: Constitutional (R)evolution or 
Regression?, [in:] National Constitutions in European and Global Governance: Democracy, 
Rights, the Rule of Law, eds. A. Albi, S. Bardutzky, the Hague 2019, pp. 1439–1443, https://
link.springer.com/content/pdf/bfm%3A978–94-6265–273-6%2F1.pdf (17.02.2020).
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ity of legal acts with Fundamental Law (10,7) and then preliminary exami-
nation, examination of conflict with international treaties and interpretation 
of Fundamental Law (1).
Comparing the activity of the Constitutional Court of Hungary after 2011 
one can see the diminishing number of the examined cases. The average of 
concluded cases in 1990–1999 was 1362, and in 2000–2011 130024.
Chart 1. Number of completed and closed cases by Constitutional Court of Hun-
gary: 2012–2019
Type of a case 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
2019








0 1 1 1 2 1 1 0 1
Conformity of 
legal acts with 
Fundamental Law
15 17 14 6 3 8 4 8 10,7
Judicial initiative for 
norm controlling in 
concrete cases
101 69 53 69 58 57 43 18 64,3
Constitutional 
complaints
752 277 357 288 284 380 387 224 389,3
Examination 
of conflict with 
international treaties
0 0 0 0 2 2 3 0 1
Interpretation of 
Fundamental Law
2 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1
Other 367 2 1 0 5 0 0 0 1,1
Together 1237 367 426 364 335 449 439 251 516,7
Source: author’s own calculations based on the Hungarian Constitutional Court Proceedings 
from 2012 to 2019, Alkotmánybíróság, https://hunconcourt.hu/ugyforgalmi-es-statiszti-
kai-adatok (11.02.1020).
24 The Constitutional Court of Hungary, Alkotmánybíróság, https://hunconcourt.hu/
ugyforgalmi-es-statisztikai-adatok (11.02.1020).
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VI.
The Montesquieu’s principle of the tripartition of power is an immanent ele-
ment of democratic state of law. This principle means that the legislative, ex-
ecutive and judiciary authorities are separated and should not overshadow 
their own competences. The Constitutional Court as an institution which ex-
amines the quality of legislative and executive acts should be independent.
Hungarian Fidesz won the 2010 elections with the overwhelming ma-
jority. It helped the party to recreate the law and political situation in the 
country. The taken actions led to the limitation of the achievements of the 
liberal democratic order that had been developing after 1989. In 2011 the 
National Assembly passed the Act on Constitutional Court of Hungary that 
replaced the previous one from 1989. In reference to the main thesis of the 
article it was verified that the 2011 Act, the Fundamental Law and further 
amendments reduced the role and position of the Court in Hungary com-
paring to the 1989 Act.
Answering the first question about the competences of the Constitution-
al Court of Hungary that were reduced after 2011 it should be stated that the 
Court became more dependent on the political party dominating in the par-
liament (the candidates for judges are nominated by a parliamentary com-
mittee while the number of deputies depends on the number of seats of par-
liamentary parties, the President is elected by the National Assembly). In the 
name of current and immediate situation, in 2011 the Act on Constitution-
al Court extended the number of judges from 11 to 15 what let Fidesz to elect 
4 own judges. The same act reduced the upper age of activity of judges to 70 
that enabled Fidesz to get rid of other judges and replace them by those loy-
al to V. Orban. The actio popularis was excluded from the possible examina-
tion by the Constitutional Court which limited the activity of civil society. 
In 2012 Fidesz amended the Fundamental Law which reduced the reviews of 
the Constitutional Court only to substantive grounds and implemented pro-
vision that the Court cannot refer to its decision made before 2012. This cut 
the continuity of the Court established in 1989.
The second additional question referred to the activity of the Constitu-
tional Court after 2011. The analysis of cases concluded by the Constitution-
al Court of Hungary after 2011 shows that the number of cases diminished 
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comparing to the cases from 1990–2011. Between 2012 and 2019 (30 Septem-
ber) the average of concluded cases was 516,7 while in 1990–1999 it was 1362 
and in 2000–2011–1300.
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